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F O R E W O R D
On behalf of the IBM Center for The Business of Government, we are pleased 
to present this report, Strategies for Supporting Frontline Collaboration: 
Lessons from Stewardship Contracting, by Dr. Cassandra Moseley, Director, 
Institute for a Sustainable Environment, University of Oregon. 
The Obama administration’s Open Government initiative places a strong 
emphasis on increasing collaboration. But how do agencies do this, especially 
on the front lines of government? Dr. Moseley examines, via a series of case 
studies, the efforts to increase frontline collaboration by two natural resource 
agencies: the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service and the U.S. 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management.
She finds that the success or failure of frontline collaboration, especially with 
community-level stakeholders, is oftentimes driven by an “agency’s culture, 
policies, procedures, and incentives.…” The role of headquarters in success-
fully achieving collaboration seems to be most effective when it promotes 
and encourages collaboration rather than directing or requiring it.
By examining the experiences of both agencies in implementing a special 
contracting authority, called stewardship contracting, she identifies four strat-
egies that appear to foster successful collaboration. These strategies include: 
• Creating time and space for collaboration 
• Changing agency rules to encourage collaboration 
• Providing staff incentives to collaborate 
• Building the capacity to collaborate in both the agencies and among 
stakeholders
The encouraging conclusion of her report is that, while agencies’ behaviors 
are often driven by their hierarchical structure, collaboration can flourish 
when an agency’s leadership commits significant energy and resources to 
focusing the organization on the value of collaboration to the mission. 
Jonathan D. Breul
Michael D. Wasson
www.businessofgovernment.org 5
STRATEGIES FOR SUPPORTING FRONTLINE COLLABORATION
We hope that this new report will serve as a useful guide for federal 
managers attempting to implement Open Government collaborative efforts 
in the field. The report’s insights and recommended strategies have wide 
applicability to many agencies across government.
Jonathan D. Breul  
Executive Director 
IBM Center for The Business of Government 
jonathan.d.breul@us.ibm.com
Michael D. Wasson 
Director and Partner, USDA Account Leader 
IBM Global Business Services 
wasson@us.ibm.com
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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y
The Obama administration’s Open Government ini-
tiative places a strong emphasis on increasing col-
laboration—among agencies as well as with citizens 
and other stakeholders—to achieve more effective 
program and mission results. Agencies have devel-
oped their required Open Government Plans, but 
many of these plans lack details on how to success-
fully conduct collaborative efforts, especially on the 
front lines of government. 
It is now useful to ask: are there examples in which 
collaboration is already being used as a part of how 
frontline workers do their jobs today? The answer: 
yes. Senior executives in two key federal land man-
agement agencies began to ask their frontline staff to 
collaborate locally, beginning in the early 1990s, as 
they saw the potential of engaging diverse groups of 
stakeholders to:
• Collaboratively resolve conflict
• Solve complex problems 
• Bring new technical and financial resources to 
the problems of land management
Despite nearly two decades of promoting collabora-
tion, its use in those agencies remains uneven today. 
Some frontline field offices within the federal gov-
ernment’s natural resources agencies have integrated 
collaboration into their culture and everyday opera-
tions while, in other places, collaboration is fleeting 
or nonexistent. What are the lessons that these pio-
neering efforts might share with other agencies?
There can be a lot of location-specific reasons for 
why collaboration is not being used. For example, 
when the trust in an agency is high and citizens are 
relatively satisfied with current levels of engagement, 
an agency may have a difficult time engaging 
collaborators. In some cases, frontline staff some-
times may not want to collaborate and thus put no 
serious effort into developing it. In other instances, 
the local sociopolitical environment can be so toxic 
that efforts to collaborate quickly degenerate, as 
people do not act in good faith or sabotage collec-
tive action. 
An agency’s culture, policies, procedures, and incen-
tives can make it either easier or more difficult for 
field staff to collaborate effectively. There are strategies 
that agency and nongovernmental leaders can use to 
encourage collaboration. This report offers four strate-
gies for collaboration based on the experiences of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s U.S. Forest Service 
and the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM). Both agencies have authori-
ties, called “stewardship contracting,” which they 
used to foster collaboration at the front line in their 
agencies. Although stewardship contracting is a set 
of authorities particular to the U.S. Forest Service 
and BLM, much of the collaboration that these two 
agencies have undertaken around stewardship con-
tracting did not require any special authority. The 
two agencies have used stewardship contracting as a 
vehicle to develop a new direction and support for 
collaborative approaches to federal land management. 
Key Strategies
Building on lessons from federal forest management 
and the use of stewardship contracting, this report 
offers four key strategies for fostering frontline col-
laboration with citizens and other stakeholders in a 
community.  
Strategy One: Create time and space for collabora-
tion to develop and mature. Robust collaboration 
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requires significant investment in time, money, and 
social capital. Collaboration is an evolutionary pro-
cess. Initial steps may involve months or even years 
of talking, and only result in small concrete accom-
plishments at the beginning. Over time, as collabor-
atives build trust and facility in working together, 
accomplishments grow. However, efforts to rush 
collaboration early on can risk failure.
Strategy Two: Change the rules to encourage col-
laboration. This can be done in several ways:
• Prioritize funding for actions that have been 
collaboratively developed. When field managers 
reach broad agreement for action with partners, 
agency executives should fund it, if at all possi-
ble. Building agreement only to have agency 
leadership unwilling to implement it demoral-
izes staff and partners, and lowers trust.
• Expand local discretion so that field staff have 
the authority to stand by the agreements they 
reach. It can be difficult for senior executives to 
feel comfortable devolving authorities because 
they may be doing so at a moment of change 
and uncertainty. In addition, field staff collabo-
rating with external partners may develop solu-
tions that are locally appropriate but different 
from what the senior executives might have 
envisioned. Nevertheless, local decision space 
is critical if field personnel and, especially, part-
ners, are going to be willing to invest time and 
resources in collaboration.
• Update existing procedures to support collab-
orative processes. These procedures might 
include requiring early engagement in planning 
processes, revising grants and agreements sys-
tems and paperwork to create more efficiencies 
in developing memoranda of understanding and 
obligating funds for agreements. It also may  
include clarifying directives about conflicts of 
interest. Engaging with field-level stakeholders 
in modifying authorities can help to ensure that 
procedures work for partners, not just for the 
agencies. Iterative learning and procedural 
changes can take advantage of and support 
innovations from the front line. 
Strategy Three: Provide incentives to staff to collab-
orate—or consequences if they don’t. This can be 
done in two ways: 
• Provide formal guidance that requires that the 
field units collaborate but which does not pre-
scribe exactly how collaboration is to occur. 
Requiring collaboration can be challenging, 
because one cannot define exactly what the 
collaboration will look like. On the other hand, 
providing no guidance creates a sense of inse-
curity and allows people who do not want to 
collaborate to avoid doing so. One approach is 
to provide something specific around which to 
collaborate—such as stewardship contracting—
rather than simply telling them to collaborate in 
general or prescribing exactly how to collaborate.
• Align organizational and personal performance 
measures so that they support collaboration, or 
at least do not run counter to collaboration. 
Performance measures that emphasize high pro-
duction but neglect quality will likely create dis-
incentives to collaborate. 
Strategy Four: Invest in building the capacity of 
both governmental and nongovernmental partners 
involved in a collaborative effort. Understand 
where in the organizations these investments need 
to be made. Such investments can take several 
forms: 
• Create a cadre of well-trained procurement and 
agreements personnel who can support program-
matic goals with timely, high-quality, innovative 
contracts and agreements. Agencies often are 
called upon to engage in more complex formal 
arrangements—contracts and agreements—with 
their partners. Slow, cumbersome contracting 
and agreements processes can frustrate and 
drive away partners; poor processes cost the 
agency and its partners time and money.
• Attend to the organizational and financial health 
of your partner organizations by providing fund-
ing for community capacity building. This is par-
ticularly important when there is a significant 
interdependence between the partners and the 
agency and the agency is working with histori-
cally underserved or disenfranchised populations. 
Community organizations and collaborations 
may require government funding to convene  
and facilitate collaborative groups, and to build 
organizational capacity to participate effec-
tively—especially in places where there are few 
non federal resources, such as in rural, historically 
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underserved, and impoverished communities. In 
addition, businesses will be unwilling to invest 
in new skills and innovations when they do not 
trust that the agency will provide a sustainable 
supply of opportunities.
• Develop and conduct training that engages 
agency personnel and nongovernmental part-
ners in the same training sessions. Joint training 
can help create a shared understanding of the 
opportunities and limits of particular opportuni-
ties and authorities. Peer-to-peer learning also 
can help to transfer lessons from early adaptors 
to other agency staff. 
www.businessofgovernment.org 9
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The Obama administration’s Open Government  
initiative places a strong emphasis on increasing 
collaboration—among agencies as well as with 
citizens and other stakeholders—to achieve more 
effective program and mission results. Agencies have 
developed their required Open Government Plans, 
but many of these plans lack details on how to suc-
cessfully conduct collaborative efforts, especially on 
the front lines of government. 
It is useful to ask: are there examples in which col-
laboration is already being used as a part of how 
frontline workers do their jobs today? The answer: 
yes. Senior executives in two key federal land man-
agement agencies began to ask their frontline staff to 
collaborate locally, beginning in the early 1990s, as 
they saw the potential of engaging diverse groups of 
stakeholders to collaboratively resolve conflict, solve 
complex problems, and bring new technical and 
financial resources to the problems of land manage-
ment. Today, there are hundreds of natural resource 
collaboratives, ranging from a few thousand acres of 
forestlands or a watershed (e.g., the Four Corners 
Fuels Partnership in the Southwest and the Lake 
County Stewardship Group in Oregon), to ecosys-
tems comprising millions of acres and multiple juris-
dictions (e.g., the Chesapeake Bay and Florida 
Everglades). These sorts of collaboratives offer fed-
eral agencies the promise of increasing their ability 
to solve complex problems, build agreement among 
divergent interests, and garner new financial and 
technical resources.
Yet, despite considerable growth in collaboration 
among government and nongovernmental partners 
to achieve mission results, the use of collaboration 
in many agencies is uneven. Some field units 
engage in sophisticated collaboratives while others 
seem to resist engagement. After providing direction, 
senior managers sometimes find themselves puzzled 
when progress is uneven or when they receive com-
plaints from constituents about a lack of collabora-
tion. Although there can be a lot of location-specific 
reasons for collaboration to be weak, frequently the 
agencies’ cultures, policies, procedures, and incen-
tives can make it difficult for field staff to collabo-
rate effectively. When collaboration runs counter to 
an agency’s organizational arrangements and cul-
ture, only those places where agency and nongov-
ernmental leadership commit significant energy and 
resources does collaboration really flourish. 
The movement toward collaboration and networked 
governance—toward a more integrated system of 
governance between government agencies, citizens, 
and nongovernmental entities—is not an easy transi-
tion. One of the central challenges is that, although 
governance in the United States is increasingly 
accomplished through a complex set of networks, 
partnerships, and collaborations, organizational 
Introduction
Siuslaw Stewardship Group examining a restoration site.
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hierarchies continue to play central and vital roles 
in government organizations. Creating a collabora-
tive effort on the front line of a bureaucratic hierar-
chy can be particularly difficult. The demands of 
vertical hierarchies in an organization and horizon-
tal collaboration with third parties are often quite 
different from one another. Hierarchies have clear 
lines of authority and reporting, whereas collabora-
tive networks are each unique and can be quite 
fluid. Hierarchies are often well institutionalized, 
having been in place for decades, or even a century, 
in many agencies. This long history can mean that 
the culture and habits of an agency’s hierarchy are 
often deeply ingrained. 
By contrast, collaborative networks have a diversity 
of people and organizations in them. In the western 
states, they can include environmental groups, ranchers, 
farmers, recreation users, and citizens who live nearby. 
With the diversity of people and organizations comes 
Understanding Collaboration 
Collaboration is a process of working together to a common end. Collaboration involves consultation, negotia-
tion, and deliberation; it often involves shared power and decision-making and a search for better information.1 
Collaboration can help solve complex problems, resolve conflict, and garner the resources and organization nec-
essary for collective action. Collaboration often occurs through networks—and often is termed networked gover-
nance. In these cases, collaboration involves not only the people involved in collaboration directly, but an array 
of people linked to the collaborators through the networks of the collaborators. These networks cross organiza-
tional boundaries and engage people at different levels in multiple hierarchies. Both collaboration and networked 
governance differ from the traditional command-and-control approach in that they are fluid and flexible, and 
often held together through interactions and social relation rather than by organizational chart and regulations. 
They require regular maintenance and use to hold them together. As collaboration and networked governance 
become more sophisticated, the boundaries between public, private, citizen, and nonprofit blur as people and 
organizations take on interconnected rather than distinct roles—governance looks like a “marble cake” rather 
than a “layer cake.”2
Natural resource collaboratives being discussed in this report are collaborations among federal agency frontline 
staff (often called field staff) from federal natural resource and land management organizations and a diversity 
of local and regional stakeholders (including local citizens, environmental activists, industry representatives, 
and other relevant people and organizations). These collaborative groups are often focused on finding com-
mon ground that allows them to develop and implement land management activities that both restore natural 
resources and create local economic opportunity. Over time, these collaborative groups often come to create 
community-based organizations that can help implement the agreements reached. In these cases, the community-
based organization typically enters into cooperative agreements or contracts with the natural resource agency to 
perform a variety of activities ranging from collaborative group facilitation to project planning to on-the-ground-
implementation and monitoring.
Stewardship contracting fosters collaborative approaches to land management by providing contracting tools that 
increase the ability of the U.S. Forest Service and BLM to enter partnerships with public and private entities to 
implement forest and watershed restoration projects and create local community benefit. 
Formally, stewardship contracting is a set of statutory contracting authorities that are designed to facilitate the 
U.S. Forest Service and BLM’s ability to restore public lands and create economic benefit for nearby com-
munities. The authorities allow for contracts and agreements that combine features of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations with these agencies’ timber sale authorities. Stewardship contracting focuses on end results and 
requires best-value contracting. It also allows revenue from the sale of timber harvested for restoration purposes 
to be applied to other restoration activities. These contracting authorities differ from older service and timber sale 
contracting authorities in that they provide broad agreement authority along with other authorities that allow for 
cooperative rather than adversarial contracting arrangements. 
Although this report focuses on stewardship contracting, the central lessons of this report for other agencies are 
not related to the specifics of these authorities, but instead are strategies for developing and integrating collabora-
tion in the everyday activities of frontline staff.
www.businessofgovernment.org 11
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a wide variety of goals, obligations, skills, and 
resources. They often cross the boundaries between 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, 
bringing in contact with one another systems with 
different goals, incentives, and obligations. Often 
nongovernmental entities organize and lead the col-
laborative groups. This is particularly true because 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires 
that federal agencies receive a formal charter if they 
are to lead a collaborative process. Without having 
an FACA-chartered group, a federal agency cannot 
put a collaborative in place or set the agenda. 
Sometimes, these sorts of networks include con-
tractual arrangements (e.g., service contracts and 
cooperative agreements) and memoranda of under-
standing to help bind them together, but this is not 
always the case. These more formalized arrange-
ments may only cover a piece of the relationship 
in any given collaborative network and may only 
emerge after long periods of conversations, meetings, 
and field tours. Most collaboratives rely on trust and 
mutual obligation rather than authority to hold them 
together. 
Decision-makers at the front line of an agency’s 
decision-making hierarchy may find themselves torn 
between their obligations to their hierarchy and the 
obligations they develop as part of their local col-
laboration. They may have limited control over the 
things about which the agency’s partners may care 
the most. Collaboration between federal agencies 
and third parties typically does not formally shift the 
federal decision-making authority of line officers, 
but partners in a collaborative nonetheless expect 
their efforts and opinions to be taken seriously. Yet, 
beyond the “decision space” of line officers there is 
a vast array of government obligations—some of it 
with room for discretion and some without. These 
obligations and the ways in which senior executives 
and local field staff interpret them greatly affect the 
power and efficacy of collaborative groups. 
Frontline collaboration between federal agencies and 
third parties at the field level—that which is rich and 
robust—requires that the collaborative have consid-
erable decision space in which to devise solutions to 
meet the goals and objectives of diverse partners. 
Field-level staff who have little room for choice—
either because line officers have no decision space 
or because of strong systems of incentives—can find 
collaboration frustrating and of limited value. Field 
staff may be told to collaborate, but know that “what 
really matters” is something quite different. Along 
with direction to collaborate, they may receive fund-
ing, accountability measures, and personnel evalua-
tions that make it difficult to collaborate. For 
example, in the case of the U.S. Forest Service, front-
line staff have been encouraged to collaborate in 
order to reduce fire hazard. At the same time they 
have been told that achieving their fire hazard-
related performance targets (acres treated) is of the 
utmost importance, and that there are budgetary 
consequences of failing to achieve the targets.
In some instances, federal agencies, their commu-
nity partners, and citizens may find themselves hav-
ing spent months reaching common ground, only to 
have the rules changed, priorities shifted, funding 
removed, or staff reassigned. Federal agencies then 
may have to back out of the commitments that they 
have made. This can create frustration and ill will 
with partners, and can cost the group significant 
time and social capital, which can take years to 
rebuild.
When the institutional obligations and cultural 
norms do not support frontline collaboration, it can 
be difficult for all but the most determined agency 
staff. In instances in which preexisiting cultural and 
structural constraints run counter to local-level col-
laboration, how can senior executives make it easier 
for their willing staff to collaborate, and create 
incentives for those who are reluctant to collaborate? 
This report offers senior executives four strategies to 
support field-level collaboration. It does so by draw-
ing on lessons from the experience of the U.S. Forest 
Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
with collaboration in general, and stewardship con-
tracting specifically. 
Agency senior executives can do much to build an 
environment that is supportive of collaboration by 
providing the structures, tools, resources, and incen-
tives to collaborate. Senior executives who want to 
see collaborations succeed must provide decision 
space, direction, training, and financial support. 
They also need to align their agency’s hierarchy to 
support the collaborative process.
Developing an atmosphere in which collaboration 
can help an agency fulfill its mission is not an easy 
IBM Center for The Business of Government12
STRATEGIES FOR SUPPORTING FRONTLINE COLLABORATION
or an instantaneous process. Change likely will be 
iterative, with direction and assistance continually 
updated by adapting to field learning and innova-
tion. Senior executives who can create processes 
that attune them to lessons from frontline staff and 
key constituents may find it easier to develop effec-
tive guidance and procedures. In the best case, 
senior staff will be able to learn from the most inno-
vative collaborative partnerships and also identify 
the problematic policies and procedures that may 
discourage collaboration. 
www.businessofgovernment.org 13
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Federal land management, like many issues facing 
the federal government, is complex and controver-
sial. It is closely followed by a diversity of people 
with deeply held beliefs and economic interests. 
Federal land management legal authorities and obli-
gations come from both Congress and the courts; 
they are sometimes contradictory and often confus-
ing. The missions of federal land management agen-
cies—such as the U.S. Forest Service, the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM), and the U.S. National 
Park Service—have shifted and become more multi-
faceted over time. A wide range of stakeholders 
expects federal lands to meet competing priorities: 
• Provide renewable and nonrenewable natural 
resources (timber, oil, gas) 
• Offer recreation and scenic beauty
• Protect beautiful, historic, and ecologically 
important places
• Respond to a variety of environmental mandates 
(clean air, water, carbon, biodiversity)
Increasingly, federal land management agencies are 
being asked to play a role in climate change adapta-
tion and mitigation. Often, these various activities 
are to occur on the same patch of ground. How 
much should each federal land management agency 
provide to each of these priorities? How they do so 
is a constant point of contention at every level of 
government, from Congress, the White House, and 
the Supreme Court to state and local government, to 
a single unit of a national forest.
Like many federal agencies, the U.S. Forest Service 
was created at the turn of the 20th century with a 
Progressive Era perspective on effective government. 
The U.S. Forest Service was designed as a decentral-
ized hierarchy of professional experts who would 
work for the public good. The BLM evolved from the 
General Land Office, and took on the expert-driven 
characteristics of the U.S. Forest Service. 
After World War II, with notions of scientific forestry 
and a political arrangement that tied these agencies’ 
budgets to the levels of timber harvested, the U.S. 
Forest Service and BLM expanded their timber har-
vest using industrial timber management techniques, 
including clear cuts and aerial application of herbi-
cides. They sold timber to sawmills and loggers, and 
purchased tree planting and other services that help 
the agency achieve its mission of efficient forest 
management. But, due to their expert-driven hier-
archies, neither of these agencies collaborated very 
much with stakeholders in the development of land 
management projects.
With the rise of environmentalism in the late 1960s, 
activists began to question the use of herbicides 
and clear cutting on public lands, and began to sue 
the U.S. Forest Service and BLM to change their 
behavior. Environmentalists were able to sue the 
federal land management agencies under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA). NEPA, passed in 
1970, requires all federal agencies to evaluate and 
disclose the environmental impacts of proposed 
actions and consider alternatives prior to making a 
final decision. The law allows individuals to appeal 
decisions on the basis of failure to disclose impacts 
and to file suits if their appeals are not satisfied. 
The ESA created a process requiring the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service and the National Marine 
Fisheries Service to place species that they consider 
at risk of extinction on a “list.” Once a species is 
Evolution of Collaboration in 
Federal Land Management 
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Bureau of Land Management
The origins of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
and the U.S. Forest Service date back to the 18th century, 
when the 13 states of the United States ceded western 
territories to the federal government. In 1812, Congress 
created the General Land Office in the Department of 
the Treasury (moved to the Department of the Interior in 
1849) to oversee the exploration, surveying, and settle-
ment of these lands as well as those acquired from colo-
nial empires including Spain, France, and Russia. 
Throughout the 19th century, Congress passed a number 
of laws such as the Homesteading Acts, the Mining Law 
of 1872, and other laws to encourage settlement. The 
General Land Office was responsible for distributing lands 
under these laws. 
In 1946, Congress created the BLM in the Department of 
the Interior by combining the U.S. Grazing Service and 
the General Land Office. The BLM had no organic act, but 
rather a couple thousand separate and sometimes conflict-
ing laws governing these BLM lands.3 In 1976, Congress 
passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA). FLPMA provided the BLM with its first unified 
legal mandate, including an obligation to manage for “mul-
tiple uses” including grazing, mining, and timber harvest as 
well as wildlife and endangered species protection, recre-
ation, and other activities. 
Today, the BLM manages 253 million acres and 700 mil-
lion subsurface mineral estates, primarily in 13 western 
states and Alaska. The BLM has about 10,000 employees 
and an annual appropriated budget of about $1 billion. 
In FY 2008, BLM collected $4.6 billion in revenue from 
various leases, primarily for minerals (oil and gas), timber, 
grazing, and recreation.4 About half of this money is given 
to the states and counties in which the revenue is gener-
ated. In the West, the BLM is divided into state offices. In 
states with significant BLM lands, state offices are further 
divided into districts, and within districts, field offices. The 
BLM director is a political appointee.
The U.S. Forest Service
Congress created a Division of Forestry in the Department 
of Agriculture in 1881 to provide forestry information 
and, a few years later, scientific experimentation. At the 
same time, timber fraud, land grabs, and a growing sense 
that western land was no longer infinite led progressives 
to seek forest reserves. In 1891, Congress authorized the 
president to designate forest reserves—timberlands that 
would be withdrawn from the public domain. By 1898, 
the General Land Office had the authority to manage 
these lands. Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, and Roosevelt 
withdrew millions of acres for forest reserves, primarily in 
the West. (During the Great Depression, Congress autho-
rized the U.S. Forest Service to acquire “cut over” and 
abandoned private lands later, which led to the eventual 
creation of national forests in the South and Northeast.) 
Concerns over graft and corruption combined with a 
desire to elevate scientific management; progressives 
such as President Teddy Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot 
succeeded in getting the forest reserves transferred to the 
Department of Agriculture. They were combined with the 
Division of Forestry to become the U.S. Forest Service in 
1905. The U.S. Forest Service’s organic act allowed for the 
management for water and a continuous timber supply; it 
prohibited clear cutting. 
In 1976, in the wake of lawsuits and significant political 
controversy over clear cutting to timber harvest, Congress 
replaced the U.S. Forest Service’s organic act with the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA). The NFMA 
authorized clear cutting but also required management 
for multiple uses including recreation and wildlife habitat, 
extensive planning requirements, and significant species 
protection. The NFMA did little to cool the ongoing con-
flict. Controversy peaked in the late 1980s, with a court 
injunction that halted all timber harvest on U.S. Forest 
Service and BLM lands in the territory of the Northern 
Spotted Owl. The Northwest Forest Plan ended timber 
management as the primary purpose on national forest 
lands in the Pacific Northwest and changed management 
nationwide. By the late 1990s, timber management had 
become only one of many purposes of the national forest 
system, with species protection and ecological restoration 
playing a larger role. 
Today, the U.S. Forest Service includes not only the 
National Forest System (which manages the national for-
ests and grasslands) but also Research and Development, 
State and Private Forestry, and International Programs. 
The National Forest System is divided into nine regions 
(regions 1-10, with no region 7). Within the regions, there 
are 165 national forests and grasslands on 193 million 
acres. The national forests and grasslands typically have 
ranger districts. A national forest is equivalent to a BLM 
field office. A U.S. Forest Service ranger district is the 
equivalent of a BLM resource area. 
The U.S. Forest Service chief is a career civil servant, 
with the Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture, Natural 
Resources and Environment, as the political appointee 
directly over the chief. 
In 2007, the U.S. Forest Service had 32,000 employees, 
down from a high of about 58,000 in the early 1980s. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Forest Service sold about 
10-12 billion board feet of timber per year. In the 2000s, 
that number declined to 2 billion board feet per year. 
For FY 2010, its appropriated budget was just over $5 
billion, with another $1 million in mandatory appropria-
tions. Over 47 percent of its budget was for wildfire man-
agement (primarily fire suppression), a dramatic increase 
from the 1990s.
History of the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service
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“listed” as threatened or endangered, public and pri-
vate individuals may no longer kill the species or 
destroy its habitat. The federal government also has 
an obligation to recover the species. As with NEPA, 
ESA has a citizen lawsuit provision that allows peo-
ple to petition for listing and then sue the federal 
government if they do not feel the government 
responded adequately. NEPA and ESA, and their citi-
zen suit provisions, provided powerful tools for 
environmentalists to press their concerns with the 
agencies.
Throughout the 1980s, tensions continued to mount. 
The situation climaxed with a court injunction in 
1991 that halted all timber harvest in the territory 
of the Northern Spotted Owl (western Washington, 
Oregon, and northern California). President Clinton 
resolved this particular injunction with the Northwest 
Forest Plan in 1994. The Northwest Forest crisis 
surrounding the protection of the Northern Spotted 
Owl led to subsequent forest plans—which marked 
the end of the agencies focusing primarily on timber 
production not only in the Pacific Northwest, but 
across West. As a result of this intense conflict, the 
Evolution of Local Natural Resource Collaboratives
In 1935, during the depths of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, Congress passed the Soil Conservation 
Act, which directed the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to create the Soil Conservation Service [later 
renamed the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS)] to reduce erosion and increase water conservation. 
Initially, the Depression-era Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) carried out soil and water conservation projects. 
Knowing that the CCC would not last forever, Under Secretary of Agriculture M. L. Wilson advocated for a sys-
tem of government assistance to farmers, in which local farmers receive direct assistance locally. To develop it, 
President Franklin Roosevelt sent the states standard legislation authorizing local special districts to manage soil 
and water conservation locally. State legislators passed these laws, and created local districts. Technically, the 
conservation districts are local governments with locally elected boards of directors. Often, they are organized 
along county boundaries. Typically, they have the authority to tax property, although they may not actually exer-
cise this authority. They also receive assistance from state agricultural departments and are closely tied to the 
NRCS. In fact, it can be difficult at times to distinguish between the work of the districts and the NRCS in some 
places. NRCS and the districts play a central role in the engagement of landowners in many of the conservation 
programs of the Farm Bill (USDA Soil Conservation Service). 
Today, there are 3,000 conservation districts nationwide. In most places, they are called “soil and water conser-
vation districts,” but in some states, such as California, they are called “resource conservation districts.” Farmers, 
ranchers, and forest landowners have long been the core constituents of the conservation districts, although in a 
few areas their constituencies have broadened over time. 
In the early 1990s, a new set of local groups emerged to locally manage natural resources. These groups often 
emerged in response to intense conflict over natural resource management. They may focus on riverine habitat 
improvement, water pollution reduction, forest management, rangeland improvements, or any number of other 
natural resource issues. They typically seek to resolve conflict and develop management solutions that lead to 
broadly supported outcomes that create ecological and socioeconomic benefits. In places with significant federal 
land ownership, agency personal often participate in these collaboratives. 
Unlike the conservation districts, these local groups emerged largely from the ground up and vary in focus and 
organization. Different from the soil and water conservation districts, they have tended to be multistakeholder 
and include not only farmers and ranchers but also environmentalists, industrial representatives, local govern-
ment, and other interested citizens. Also different than the soil and water conservation districts, most of these 
groups are not government sanctioned. There are exceptions, however, such as in Oregon, Washington, and 
Ohio. In Oregon, for example, local watershed councils have been a core part of the state’s strategy to recover 
endangered salmon. In the late 1990s, the Oregon state legislature recognized and funded watershed councils 
to organize locally to improve watershed health and salmon habitat. 
Both the natural resource collaboratives and, to a lesser extent, the soil and water conservation districts have 
been important partners with the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM in the development and implementation of 
stewardship contracting projects. 
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U.S. Forest Service and BLM lost considerable pub-
lic and congressional trust in how they conducted 
their missions. The U.S. Forest Service, in particular, 
is now subject to increased oversight by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the courts, and 
Congress, as well as to more skeptical scrutiny by 
stakeholder advocacy groups.
In response to the Northwest Forest crisis, a range of 
grassroots nongovernmental groups emerged across 
the West, as local residents sought to move beyond 
ongoing conflicts that pitted jobs versus the environ-
ment. These groups sought collaborative solutions 
that could improve the environment and create jobs. 
In many cases, these collaborative efforts emerged 
from the bottom up rather than as a result of direc-
tion from above, and have varied considerably in 
form, structure, participation, and purpose. 
One example of this sort of collaboration developed 
in rural Wallowa County in northeastern Oregon. 
The federal government manages 56 percent of the 
land in the county. In the mid-1990s, the relation-
ship between groups in the county reached a low 
point when two prominent environmentalists were 
hung in effigy. Declining federal timber harvests and 
cattle and sheep grazing permits were threatening 
natural resource livelihoods; eventually, all the saw-
mills in the county closed. County commissioners 
contacted a Portland-based nonprofit, Sustainable 
Northwest, to help the county find a new way  
forward. Through years of conversation and small 
confidence-building steps, county residents, local 
environmentalists, and the U.S. Forest Service have 
developed a deep culture of collaboration. This col-
laboration has allowed them to plan and implement 
sophisticated projects to restore ecological health 
and redevelop a small-scale local forest products 
industry using the small trees and brush that are  
created through restoration activities.
Not only in Wallowa County, but across the West, 
there has been growing, if sometimes tentative and 
incomplete, agreement that collaborative forest res-
toration should be at the center of federal forest 
management. Restoration is the improvement of 
ecological conditions through activities such as tree 
thinning and planting, improvements to river habitat 
for endangered species, and road maintenance and 
removal. In public forests in much of the West,  
restoration is focused on restoring fire-adapted  
ecosystems and creating wildlife habitat on land. 
Many of the forests have dense thickets of small 
trees and brush due to post-logging practices and a 
century of fire suppression. Part of the support has 
emerged with the realization that conducting resto-
ration activities has the potential to create jobs, 
directly, in the performance of restoration activities, 
and indirectly, through the utilization of the by-
products of restoration (mostly small trees and 
brush). For some, the economic activity associated 
with forest restoration has the potential to reduce 
the negative impacts of the declines in the forest 
products industry and changes in federal land man-
agement that have occurred since the early 1990s.
The level of agreement varied considerably from 
place to place, with the most common areas of 
agreement being thinning near homes to reduce fire 
risk and in ponderosa pine and aspen stands to 
reduce the density of trees to create the open, park-
like conditions that existed when there was regular 
fire. There is less agreement about how to manage 
wetter and high-elevation landscapes. There remains 
a fundamental disagreement about what should 
happen after restoration is complete—permanent 
protection or a sustainable flow of timber and non-
timber products.
Collaboration between government land agencies 
and nongovernment stakeholders can pay off con-
siderably for government agencies, developing new 
solutions to complex problems, building good will 
among constituents, increasing financial and techni-
cal resources, and reducing appeals and litigation. 
Yet, with a long history of internal agency experts 
developing projects and a hierarchy to drive the 
direction, collaboration had not come easily to 
these agencies. Building agreement and moving 
through the planning process to implementation can 
often take years. And, once the agreement is reached, 
the agencies have not always had the tools to imple-
ment an agreement. 
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Introduction to Stewardship 
Contracting
Stewardship contracting is a set of authorities that 
changes the way that the U.S. Forest Service and the 
BLM contract and partner with outside entities. 
These authorities allow the U.S. Forest Service and 
the BLM to enter into both contracts and agreements 
to perform restoration work and create local com-
munity benefit. It requires that the agencies consider 
the best value to the government when awarding 
these contracts and agreements, not just the price. 
The authority allows timber harvest and service 
activities in a single contract, and permits the value 
of timber to pay for service activities. Excess reve-
nue (called “retained receipts”) can be kept at the 
field level and applied to additional service activi-
ties in subsequent contracts. The authority allows for 
10-year contracts and a number of other innovations. 
The current law authorizing stewardship contracting 
does not explicitly require collaboration. However, 
both U.S. Forest Service and BLM guidance require 
frontline staff to collaborate with local stakeholders 
to develop and implement projects. 
In the late 1990s, the idea of stewardship contract-
ing emerged among a small group of community 
leaders and loggers in northwestern Montana who 
had taken lessons from some contracting experi-
ments in the 1980s.5 Beginning in the mid-1990s, 
independent loggers in northwestern Montana had 
brought together a diverse group of stakeholders to 
talk about how national forest management could 
address the needs of the land and the community. 
Over several years, these stakeholders worked hard 
to build agreement for forest restoration projects to 
reduce fire hazard, restore grizzly bear and bull 
trout habitats, and reduce noxious weeds. They 
wanted to create an economic benefit for local log-
gers and contractors. Because they were trying new 
types of forest management, and had a fragile trust, 
they wanted to treat the project as an experiment 
and monitor and learn from the outcomes. 
After reaching agreement between the U.S. Forest 
Service and community leaders, the parties found 
out that the U.S. Forest Service did not have the 
authority to implement the projects in ways that 
people had supported. Neither the U.S. Forest 
Service timber sale mechanisms nor the service con-
tracts under the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR) met the needs of the proponents of collabora-
tive restoration. One central challenge was that 
much of the forest restoration involved the cutting 
and removal of trees with both commercial and 
noncommercial value. Existing authorities required 
the U.S. Forest Service to use high-bid timber sales 
and low-bid service contracts following precise U.S. 
Forest Service prescriptions. It was an adversarial 
system that rewarded inexpensive rather than high-
quality work—precisely the opposite of what was 
needed when the goal was ecological restoration 
within a context of fragile trust. The old system 
required multiple entries, multiple contracts, and high 
administrative costs. There was no real way to pay for 
the work—the national forest appropriated funds 
were inadequate, and timber revenue that would be 
generated was too restricted to pay for the agreed-
upon treatments. The use of timber revenue to pay for 
other restoration activities was prohibited as an illegal 
augmentation of congressional appropriations.
The community leaders from western Montana went 
to their congressional representatives and proposed 
a simple piece of legislation. Senator Max Baucus 
(D-MT) and representative Pat Williams (D-MT) 
What Is Stewardship Contracting?
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introduced legislation in 1995. However, without 
support of Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT), it failed to 
get a hearing. Eventually, Senator Burns embraced 
the idea and facilitated a rider to the FY 1999 
appropriation (P.L. 105-227, Sec. 347). Initially, 
Congress authorized a number of pilot projects, with 
many of them to be located in Montana and Idaho, 
reflecting the interests of the congressional champi-
ons. This authority was reauthorized in each subse-
quent year along with the pilot projects. The U.S. 
Forest Service also was required to undertake multi-
party monitoring. Multiparty monitoring engages the 
entities implementing projects and other interested 
stakeholders in a process of developing and imple-
menting a system for evaluating the activities and 
lessons from the projects and programs.7 The idea 
was that these pilot projects would test these new 
contracting authorities and act as incubators for 
learning and adaptive management. Over time, these 
early requirements for engaging diverse stakeholders 
Stewardship Contracting Authorities6
Stewardship contracting is a set of contracting authorities that are designed to increase the ability of the U.S. 
Forest Service and the BLM to restore public lands while creating local community benefit. It allows the agencies 
to combine into a single contract the sale of timber and the procurement of services. It requires that the agen-
cies select contractors based on best value to the government, and allows the use of a number of features of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations, such as end results contracting. It also expanded the ability of the agencies to 
use cooperative agreements to implement public land management activities.
Best value—This stewardship authority requires that the agencies use a “best value” criterion when awarding 
contracts for stewardship projects. The best value contracting allows the agency to consider factors other than 
price, and award contracts to businesses that will perform high-quality work and help the agency meet its objec-
tives. This is a major change from timber sale requirements, which require that agencies award contracts to the 
highest qualified bidder and acquisition regulations which allow but do not require awarding contracts on the 
basis of the best value to the government.
Goods for services—The exchange of goods for services can provide funding for ecosystem restoration by allow-
ing the value of removed products to offset the cost of services in a single contract. These products could include 
timber, nontimber forest products, grazing access, etc. By allowing the combination of timber removal and ser-
vice activities in a single contract, goods for services can minimize the ecological impacts by reducing the num-
ber of entries into an area and increase funding for restoration activities. 
Retention of receipts—Generally, the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM must send the receipts of timber sales 
(less payments to counties and trust deposits) to the federal Treasury. Through receipt retention, the agency may 
retain locally the proceeds from the sale of commercial products removed through a stewardship contract, but 
must reinvest them in the same or another stewardship project.
Agreements—The stewardship contracting authority allows the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM to enter into 
agreements, not just contracts, with nonprofit organizations and other entities to implement stewardship projects. 
Designation by description—Under this expanded authority, in place of designation by timber marking, land 
managers can describe a desired “end result.” The contractor is responsible for developing and implementing a 
plan to meet the end result. The failure to achieve the end result would result in penalties against the contractor. 
This is an existing service contract authority. Under traditional timber sale authority, the U.S. Forest Service must 
either designate trees to be removed or retained (usually by marking them with paint), or describe what is to be 
removed or retained so that any two people would chose the same trees. 
Multiyear contracts—This authority allows contracts and agreements for up to 10 years. 
Less than full and open competition—This authority exempts stewardship projects from the requirement that all 
timber sales valued over $10,000 be advertised and competitively bid. With this authority, preference may be 
given to, for example, small businesses or bidders in particular locations. Less than full and open competition is 
permitted (and sometimes required) for service contracts. 
Exemption of timber payments to counties—Both the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM are typically obligated 
to pay county governments a percentage (25 percent to 50 percent) of revenue from timber sales to the counties 
where the timber is harvested. This authority exempts payments to counties when the timber is harvested using a 
stewardship contract or agreement.
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in project monitoring evolved into administrative 
field guidance to require collaboration earlier in the 
process, especially in project planning and design.
In an era of partisan bickering, stewardship contract-
ing has enjoyed bipartisan popularity. When President 
George W. Bush created the Healthy Forest Initiative 
early in his first term in response to a series of histori-
cally large wildfires in 2000 and 2001, stewardship 
contracting was one of the three pillars in his strategy 
to reduce wildfire risk. Shortly thereafter, to the sur-
prise of friends and foes, authority for unlimited stew-
ardship contracting for 10 years for both the U.S. 
Forest Service and the BLM was inserted into the FY 
2003 Omnibus Appropriation Act (PL 108-7, Sec. 323). 
Since then, Democrats and Republicans in Congress 
included permanent stewardship contracting authority 
in a variety of western public lands bills in 2009 and 
2010. President Obama’s budget proposal for the U.S. 
Forest Service for FY 2011 sets out stewardship con-
tracting as the central contracting tool that the U.S. 
Forest Service will use for forest management.
Formally, stewardship contracting is a set of con-
tracting authorities that were designed to restore 
federal lands and create local community benefit. 
But, stewardship contracting offers a lens into col-
laboration, which can shed light on the challenges 
and opportunities of field-level collaboration.
As already suggested, stewardship contracting 
allows for new contracting and agreements authori-
ties that are different from those that are typically 
available under the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
and the timber sale provisions of federal land man-
agement agencies. Stewardship contracting creates 
new ways to engage with external entities in the 
implementation of land management.
With stewardship contracting, the U.S. Forest Service 
and the BLM direct staff to collaborate with commu-
nities and stakeholders in the development and 
implementation of projects. 
These resulting collaboratives offer a window into a 
process of public deliberation and problem solving 
at the field staff level of the federal decision-making 
hierarchy. As these stewardship collaboratives have 
emerged and developed, they often have started as 
informal collaboratives involving conversation, 
meetings, and field tours during which people iden-
tify common ground and common barriers and seek 
solutions. 
In the early stages of collaboration, implementation 
is likely accomplished using traditional mechanisms 
such as in-house staff, timber sales, service contracts, 
and maybe even stewardship contracts, developed in 
a relatively routine manner. Over time, cooperative 
agreements and other innovative stewardship con-
tracting mechanisms have been used to create finan-
cial relationships between partners, especially to 
conduct nonroutine activities, to experiment with 
new strategies, and to bring additional financial and 
technical resources to the collaborative from non-
federal entities.
Timeline
1980s—The U.S. Forest Service begins to experiment 
with a variety of service and timber sale contracting 
mechanisms designed to improve land management 
and funding for on-the-ground activities.
1995—Stewardship contracting authorities similar 
to the current form are first introduced in Congress.
FY 1999 appropriation—Congress authorizes the 
U.S. Forest Service to embark on 28 stewardship 
contracting pilot projects.
FY 2000–2002 appropriation—Each year, Congress 
authorizes 28 additional stewardship contracting 
pilot projects.
FY 2003 appropriation—Congress authorizes a 
10-year stewardship contracting authority for the 
U.S. Forest Service and the BLM.
FY 2004—The U.S. Forest Service and the BLM 
issue contracting templates and initial interim direc-
tion, which includes direction to collaborate with 
local partners.
FY 2008—The U.S. Forest Service convenes a mid-
term internal review and engages stakeholders in 
recommending improvements.
FY 2010—The U.S. Forest Service releases steward-
ship agreement templates and begins work to revise 
stewardship contracting templates.
FY 2013 (year end)—Current stewardship contracting 
authority is scheduled to expire, unless reauthorized.
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Although stewardship contracting offers a promis-
ing a set of tools for implementing collaborative 
restoration, it is also challenging for the U.S. Forest 
Service and the BLM because:
• It has involved changing long-standing proce-
dures. In the case of timber sale contracting, 
prior to the introduction of stewardship con-
tracting, most of the timber sale procedures and 
forms had not changed in decades.
• It has shifted the balance of power within vari-
ous parts of these agencies. Stewardship con-
tracting has brought service contracting and 
acquisition management, which has been 
largely viewed as part of the “business side of 
the house,” into land management, where tim-
ber staff had long held sway. 
• It runs counter to some larger institutional 
pressures—particularly in accomplishing short-
term targets. Although stewardship contracting 
and associated collaboration requirements offer 
the potential to lower treatment costs and 
reduce delays due to appeals and litigation in 
the medium term, the process of learning about 
stewardship contracting and developing a 
shared vision with partners has been a continu-
ing challenge. The U.S. Forest Service and the 
BLM have faced significant pressure to increase 
the number of acres they treat (perform some 
sort of activity on) each year, while their bud-
gets for doing so declined. This pressure has 
forced some national forests to focus their efforts 
on short-term target accomplishment rather than 
on innovation. This happens because there are 
risks that innovation may result in lower targets 
in the short term. 
• It requires significant technical knowledge. 
Stewardship involves contracting, the details 
about which many land managers know little. 
Contracting has largely been left to contracting 
officers. But that is not really possible with stew-
ardship contracting, which has meant that many 
frontline personnel have had to develop at least 
a passing understanding of procurement.
• It requires the development and strengthening 
of relationships with external partners. 
Although both the U.S. Forest Service and the 
BLM had generally increased their focus on col-
laboration, it is an approach that remains cultur-
ally difficult for these agencies, which have 
decades of history of hierarchical organization 
and inward focus.
Pilot Authority
During the pilot period, between 1999 and 2002, 
the U.S. Forest Service provided limited direction, 
and frontline management units had to figure out 
how to develop contracts and experiment on their 
own. There was a number of innovative projects but 
limited institutional commitment, in part due to 
year-to-year reauthorization and the limited number 
of projects that Congress permitted.
The law required project-level, multiparty monitor-
ing. The idea of multiparty monitoring was to engage 
a diversity of stakeholders with the U.S. Forest 
Service to learn about how these new authorities 
were functioning, and to identify opportunities for 
improvements. Beyond the multiparty monitoring, 
the U.S. Forest Service did not require the national 
forests to collaborate, although many of them did. 
It was often those already collaborating that sought 
early designation as pilots. In other cases, the 
requirement to create multiparty monitoring also  
led to broader collaborative engagement. 
To steer clear of the FACA and its requirement for 
chartered groups, the U.S. Forest Service became a 
participant in the collaboratives and did not set the 
meeting agenda or call the meetings. In the pilot 
period, some projects fizzled while others became 
the first contract in a long series of contracts and 
agreements to implement collaborative restoration. 
10-Year Authority 
Shortly after receiving the 10-year authority in  
FY 2003, both the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM 
issued guidance to the field that provided consider-
ably more direction than had been the case under the 
annually-authorized pilot program. As part of that 
guidance, management units were required to col-
laborate with external partners in the development of 
projects. The U.S. Forest Service’s collaborative direc-
tion was broader than the BLM’s, directing its staff to 
engage as partners in all phases of the project, 
whereas the BLM’s guidance focused on external 
engagement to determine local community needs 
and benefits. Neither sets of guidance specified what 
collaboration should look like, but rather emphasized 
that it should reflect local circumstances. This was an 
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approach heartily supported by nongovernmental 
organizations engaged in stewardship contracting.
The guidance also clarified how contracts and 
agreements should be used, narrowed the uses of 
retained receipts, and provided numerous adminis-
trative clarifications. Over time, the U.S. Forest 
Service also developed training modules, largely 
targeted at its own staff, and did not include its non-
governmental partners. In a couple regions of the 
country, the U.S. Forest Service and nongovernmen-
tal partners developed joint training sessions, allow-
ing citizens and staff to gain introductory knowledge 
of stewardship contracting together. 
The shift from experimentation to institutionalization 
led to the creation of more rules and procedures. 
There has been some concern during the process of 
institutionalization that it created a less fluid and 
flexible system. This was a mixed bag for national 
forests. On the one hand, it lowered risk and cre-
ated clarity for those who were hesitant about using 
the new authorities. However, for early adopters and 
innovators, it made experimentation and change 
more difficult.
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A decade after the initial pilot projects, and more 
than half a decade since the passage of the 10-year 
authority, the use of stewardship contracting ranges 
widely across the national forest system and BLM 
districts. Some national forests and districts have 
made stewardship contracts and collaboration a 
core part of their approach to land management. For 
example, the Eldorado National Forest in the Sierra 
Nevada of California receives fewer dollars than 
other, better-known forests in its region. As a result, 
it has come to rely on stewardship contracting to 
expand its limited budget allocation. Similarly, the 
Fremont National Forest in southeastern Oregon has 
made stewardship contracting the center of a strat-
egy to implement a broadly supported collaborative 
agreement for ecological restoration that would 
maintain and modernize the local sawmill. Yet, 
other national forests have been less interested in 
stewardship contracting. For example, national for-
est staff and local elected officials to the south and 
west of the Fremont National Forest have been less 
interested in stewardship contracting, preferring tra-
ditional timber sale contracts. 
The following five case studies present in-depth 
looks at a select number of the national forests and 
BLM districts that have integrated stewardship con-
tracting into the way they do their work. These case 
studies illustrate the ways in which collaboration 
can evolve over time, and suggest some ways in 
which senior executives can support such efforts.
Siuslaw National Forest, Oregon
Time Frame: 2002 to present, with collaboration 
dating back to the late 1980s
Key Actors: 
• Central Coast Ranger District, Siuslaw National 
Forest
• Siuslaw Institute
• Siuslaw Soil and Water Conservation District
• Siuslaw Watershed Council
• Cascade-Pacific Resource Conservation District
• Oregon Wild
• Traditional timber sale purchasers
Background: One early 
pilot project was in the 
Siuslaw Watershed in 
western Oregon. The 
small unincorporated 
community of Mapleton 
and surrounding settlements are about 45 minutes 
west of the University of Oregon, which is located 
in Eugene. In the 1970s, many residents worked as 
loggers or in the sawmills, while others were indi-
viduals who had moved “back to the land,” starting 
farms, small businesses, and communes (some of 
which still exist today.) The last sawmill closed in 
2004, and the property now stands vacant. The U.S. 
Forest Service has since shut its ranger station in 
Mapleton as well.
As a national forest located in a temperate rain 
forest, trees grow fast and large. Clear cutting old 
growth timber and replanting was at the core of the 
forest’s postwar management strategy. Yet, with high 
rainfall and steep slopes, the Siuslaw National Forest 
became the center of the controversy in the early 
1980s over clear cutting old growth forests, long 
before the question was raised in other places in the 
Suislaw National Forest
Collaborative Stewardship 
Contracts: Case Studies
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Pacific Northwest. Outside environmentalists filed a 
lawsuit to stop clear cutting the forest because of the 
impacts it was having in the rivers in the late 1980s. 
In 1988, the “Headwall Injunction” halted large 
clear cuts on the forest. With the subsequent listing 
of several bird and salmon species with critical  
habitat on that national forest as threatened and 
endangered under the Endangered Species Act, 
management focused only on timber production 
was becoming impossible. 
In the early 1990s, the forest supervisor overhauled 
the culture and management of the national forest by 
developing collaborative relationships with a range 
of interest groups, local organizations, and citizens, 
particularly in the Siuslaw Watershed. The national 
forest reoriented its land management to focus on 
improving habitat for a number of threatened species 
including spotted owls, marbled murletts, and coho 
salmon. Timber harvest was now focused primarily 
on activities that would hasten the development of 
old-growth characteristics and improve endangered 
species’ habitats. By driving timber harvest along 
ecological restoration goals, the Siuslaw National 
Forest became the first forest to be able to sell timber 
without legal appeals from environmentalists after 
the Northwest Forest Plan was adopted in 1994.
Stewardship Contracts and Agreements: When the 
stewardship contracting pilot authority came along, 
local forest service and community leaders saw it  
as a way to build on their existing agreement and 
increase habitat improvements. Working with exist-
ing partners, including the local watershed council, 
the soil and water conservation district, Eugene-
based environmentalists, timber sale purchasers,  
and other local nonprofit organizations, the forest 
formed the Siuslaw Stewardship Group in 2002 and 
applied for a pilot stewardship project. The forest 
developed stewardship contracts that combined 
complex tree thinning and stream restoration into  
a single contract. Because of the high value of the 
trees they were harvesting, they were able to trade 
goods for services and still have excess timber 
receipts to spend on subsequent restoration projects. 
These retained receipts projects were focused pri-
marily on roads and rivers, in an effort to restore 
salmon habitat.
The Siuslaw Stewardship Group realized that salmon 
recovery required restoration of the lowlands and 
estuaries, which were not under U.S. Forest Service 
control. Their innovation was to combine steward-
ship contracting with an another authority that 
allows for the expenditure of national forest system 
funds on lands adjacent to national forests if the 
spending benefits the national forest.8 With the 
retained receipts, the watershed council, the soil 
and water conservation district, other local organi-
zations, and landowners were able to leverage state 
and private funds to accomplish restoration projects 
on private land that benefited the national forest and 
facilitated the federal government’s obligation to 
restore endangered species. The Siuslaw National 
Forest used the retained receipts to enter into coop-
erative agreements with the Cascade Pacific 
Resource Conservation District. The resource con-
servation district, with partners, then developed a 
competitive grant process to develop and implement 
restoration on private lands that would benefit 
national forestlands and restore endangered species. 
The soil and water conservation district, the water-
shed council, and other organizations applied for 
these funds. They combined state and private funds 
with the retained receipts to do estuary, wetland, 
road, and river crossing restoration to improve fish 
passage and habitat for endangered salmon.
Lessons Learned: The Siuslaw National Forest’s long-
standing collaboration enabled it to capitalize on 
the stewardship contracting when it came along. 
Stewardship contracting was a set of tools that 
allowed the Siuslaw National Forest to implement its 
agreements about how it should manage the forest. 
The collaboration emerged not because of steward-
ship contracting, but out of years of conversation 
about how to manage the national forest and sur-
rounding landscape to restore ecological function, 
restore endangered species, and sustain the remain-
ing natural resource industry.
Although the Siuslaw National Forest was able to 
accomplish a lot of land treatment and create eco-
nomic benefit in the woods and with logs to nearby 
mills, as early adaptors the national forest and its 
partners often found themselves in conflict with 
their superiors about implementation. This was in 
part because they ran into stewardship contracting 
implementation issues that their superiors had not 
anticipated, but it also was because they were inno-
vative. Despite apparent directions to innovate, 
superiors sometimes became nervous when the 
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national forest and its partners did develop 
approaches that seemed to be too innovative. 
Although a natural part of institutional learning, the 
issue was a source of considerable frustration. In 
addition, because they were creative early adaptors, 
as stewardship contracting matured, the Washington 
office of the U.S. Forest Service began to narrow the 
range of permitted activities and the decision space 
of national forest staff, which created ill will among 
partners and led the national forest to have to 
renege on agreements about the range of activities 
that retained receipts could fund. 
Today, the national forest and its partners continue 
to make stewardship contracting a core part of their 
work. After the national forest had completed sev-
eral projects in the Siuslaw Watershed, two new col-
laboratives were created to broaden the use of 
collaborative stewardship contracting across the 
entire forest.
Deschutes National Forest, Oregon
Time Frame: 2002 to present
Key Actors: 
• Sisters Ranger District, Deschutes National 
Forest
• Friends of the Metolius
• Oregon Wild
• Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project
• Melcher Logging and other contractors
Background: In Central 
Oregon, without the 
involvement of external 
entities, the Deschutes 
National Forest sought 
approval for a steward-
ship project in the Metolius Basin in 2002, at about 
same time as did the Siuslaw National Forest. This 
project focused primarily on reducing wildfire hazard 
by thinning small and midsized trees. In contrast to the 
Siuslaw stewardship pilot, when this project started, 
tensions were high. The U.S. Forest Service had 
largely completed project planning prior to engaging 
the public, and was not yet persuaded that it should 
involve citizens much in the project planning pro-
cess. Agency personnel initially saw collaboration  
as a process of gaining support for the ranger district’s 
goals and priorities. But, some environmentalists did 
not trust the agency and did not want to see any 
trees cut, while other participants wanted to see 
trees thinned to reduce the fire risks to their favorite 
fishing holes and other socially important places. 
Environmentalists were frequently appealing and liti-
gating proposed projects. In addition, there were few 
contractors interested in performing the new kind of 
work and few markets for the small trees and brush 
that needed to be removed to reduce fire hazard. 
Initially, a diverse group of local stakeholders and 
the ranger district could only agree to conduct moni-
toring together; they could not reach agreement on 
what management activities should occur. Through 
the monitoring process, however, they were able to 
identify broadly supported successes as well as 
opportunities for improvement. 
Building on initial monitoring efforts, which involved 
field trips to look at proposed and completed 
treatments, various stakeholders and national forest 
staff were able to build common ground and 
increase the zone of agreement. Over time, they 
deepened and broadened citizen involvement in 
project development and contractor selection. With 
each subsequent project, the number of partners 
grew, as did their level of input.
Stewardship Contracts and Agreements: During the 
time period described above, the national forest 
developed and tested stewardship contract provi-
sions that encouraged a contractor to lease new 
equipment and develop new business relationships. 
By making use of best-value provisions, the national 
forest was able to choose contractors that were will-
ing to look for new markets, and to reward contrac-
tors that were willing to provide more local benefit. 
It did so by developing a contract solicitation that 
was end-results focused, and allow contractors to 
describe how they would use small trees and create 
local benefit. In addition, it asked contractors to 
describe how they would minimize environmental 
impacts and maximize ecological and local commu-
nity benefits. In addition to creating a better final 
outcome in the forest, the contract format served to 
build trust among stakeholders, who were leery of 
hazardous fuels reduction because of their past 
experiences with the ways in which timber sale  
contractors had impacted the forest and soils. 
Deschutes 
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After the Sisters Ranger District and its collaborators 
had a few stewardship contracts under way, each 
with more stakeholder involvement than the previ-
ous one, in 2008, the district entered into an part-
nership agreement with one of the environmental 
organizations involved in the collaborative—Oregon 
Wild. Oregon Wild was an active participant but 
had frequently appealed proposed projects of the 
Deschutes National Forest in the past. Under this 
agreement, Oregon Wild was to lead the environ-
mental assessment and planning process for the next 
stewardship contract, including the development 
and analysis of alternative management strategies as 
required under NEPA.
Lessons Learned: Unlike the Siuslaw case study, 
stewardship contracting was a central impetus 
around which collaboration initially evolved in the 
Metolius stewardship. The requirement for multi-
party monitoring nudged the frontline personnel to 
engage with their sometime adversaries. Although 
trust was low on both sides initially, long conversa-
tions, field trips, and small successes built trust over 
time. This collaborative process has not entirely 
eliminated project appeals or conflict, but it has 
enabled the district to increase the amount of work 
it can accomplish by reducing conflict and the fre-
quency of appeals, trading timber value for restora-
tion work, and creating incentives for contractors to 
identify new markets for the small trees that previ-
ously would have been piled and burnt. 
Working collaboratively, the Sisters Ranger District 
has been able to actively manage a landscape of 
high emotional and social value to local residents. 
Its contracting strategies have fostered new business 
capacity to help the U.S. Forest Service restore  
forests as well as create local economic benefit. 
Collaborative engagement helped the frontline staff 
think creatively and innovate along multiple fronts 
in ways that would have been challenging for a 
conflict-ridden natural resource agency.
Shasta-Trinity National Forest, 
California
Time Frame: 1992 to present
Key Players: 
• Watershed Research and Training Center
• Hayfork Ranger Station, Shasta-Trinity National 
Forest
• Post Mountain Volunteer Fire Department
• Local and national environmental activists
• Local residents, with a diversity of perspectives
Background: In the com-
munity of Hayfork in  
far northern California, 
residents and the Hayfork 
Ranger District of the 
Shasta-Trinity National 
Forest began collaborating 
in 1992, in the wake of 
the Spotted Owl crisis 
and impending mill closures. The federal government 
manages more than 70 percent of the land in Trinity 
County, where Hayfork is located. Without federal 
timber harvest to support the economy, a few leaders 
in the community realized that the community was 
going to have to learn how to work together to 
address rapidly deteriorating economic conditions 
and growing poverty in the community. With little 
private land to serve as the basis of the economy, 
they realized that the ecological restoration of the 
federal forest was one of their best opportunities. 
These leaders formed the Watershed Research and 
Training Center to be a nonprofit organization that 
could help with efforts to restore the forest and cre-
ate economic opportunity. The Watershed Center 
was initially involved in retraining displaced forest 
workers to perform forest and watershed restoration, 
working with the national forest and local commu-
nity residents to develop restoration projects, and in 
developing new harvesting strategies, wood process-
ing businesses, and markets for small diameter wood. 
By the mid-1990s, the national forest budget had 
dropped dramatically, and the ranger district began 
a long period of downsizing and reorganization. 
This further reduced the national forest’s capacity to 
manage its lands independently. Over time, the 
Watershed Research and Training Center came to be 
increasingly involved in planning and conducting 
environmental analysis for projects to occur on the 
Hayfork ranger district. Even though this community 
and ranger district have been collaborating for 15 
years, there continues to be significant conflict over 
Shasta-Trinty
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how the national forest should be managed. As with 
the Sisters Ranger District, environmentalists invari-
ably appealed the Hayfork Ranger District’s proposed 
projects involving timber removal. 
Stewardship Contracts and Agreements: With the 
Watershed Research and Training Center director 
involved in forest policy nationally, the Hayfork 
community knew about stewardship contracting 
very early on. The national forest applied for pilot 
status at the behest of the community, and was 
awarded one of the first stewardship pilot projects. 
The project was for hazardous fuels reduction, habi-
tat improvements, and road restoration. Although 
the collaborative group, including the Watershed 
Research and Training Center and ranger district, 
had a lot of experience working together, they strug-
gled to put together a viable stewardship contract. 
Some challenges revolved around being one of the 
first to attempt a stewardship contract, which meant 
that they had no guideposts or experiences upon 
which to build. There was no contracting template 
to follow, and contracting staff struggled to develop 
a comprehensible contract. In addition, the land-
scape has steep topography, slow-growing trees, and 
high fire hazard, which makes thinning and road 
work expensive. The thinning and road removal 
activities the collaborative developed far outstripped 
the funds available to pay for them. Eventually, the 
ranger district abandoned the pilot project. Learning 
from the early experience over time, however, the 
ranger district and national forest developed increas-
ingly larger projects and were able to put together 
stewardship contracts and agreements that met mul-
tiple goals, although the emphasis came to be pri-
marily on hazardous fuels reduction. 
A subsequent stewardship project involved commu-
nity wildfire protection planning around the isolated 
subdivision of Post Mountain, which was surrounded 
by national forestlands. Both public and private 
lands were crowded with small-diameter timber and 
brush, putting the community at extreme risk for 
wildfires. Through a long series of community meet-
ings organized by the Post Mountain Volunteer Fire 
Department and the Watershed Center, participants 
were able to encourage private landowners to thin 
trees and brush on their own lands and to develop a 
treatment plan for the national forestlands. They 
developed the Post Mountain stewardship contract, 
involving considerable service work along with some 
removal of timber. This project was the first in a 
decade that environmentalists did not appeal.
However, as with the earlier projects, initial bids 
were far above available funding. Going back to the 
drawing board, the district reduced the scope of 
work and reoffered the contract. Faced again with 
the possibility of one or no bidders, the nonprofit 
Watershed Research and Training Center decided to 
bid, and was ultimately awarded the contract. The 
center focused on lowering costs by increasing the 
utilization of small-diameter trees. It began imple-
mentation in summer 2007, but faced a series of 
setbacks, including having a major piece of equip-
ment catch fire and the meltdown of the lumber 
markets in the wake of the housing crisis. Following 
this, its major wood purchaser reduced staff and log 
buying and then, in 2009, the last remaining saw-
mill in the county suffered major damage in an 
accidental fire and had to close to rebuild. 
In the midst of these setbacks, environmentalists 
sued the U.S. Forest Service in California, success-
fully arguing that the Eldorado National Forest was 
not considering the cumulative effects of its hazard-
ous fuels reduction efforts. The success of the law-
suit halted all projects that has been analyzed using 
the same method, including the Post Mountain stew-
ardship contract. Before the Watershed Center can 
continue implementing the project, the ranger dis-
trict has to redo the environmental analysis and 
issue a new decision. The earliest that operations 
could resume is in the summer of 2012. 
Lessons Learned: The challenges that the Hayfork 
community and ranger district have faced raise at 
least one critical issue that goes far beyond land 
management. One of the central challenges facing 
the ranger district and the community is the lack of 
agency and business capacity. The ranger district 
had radically downsized, and now looks to non-
profit and for-profit organizations to perform much 
of the work that the U.S. Forest Service once did  
in-house. Yet, with the decline of federal timber  
harvest, nearly all of the logging firms and wood 
products manufacturing companies have gone out  
of business, making it very difficult for the district to 
contract out work, especially at an affordable price. 
With high unemployment and poverty rates, finding 
entrepreneurs willing to build businesses to participate 
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in restoration has proven difficult. This is  
particularly true given the high risks associated  
with inconsistent U.S. Forest Service budgets and 
frequent appeals, which reduce the consistency  
of contracting opportunities. Although nonprofit 
organizations have partially stepped into the breach, 
federal staffing, financial resources, and contracting  
market stability are critical pieces that need to be in 
place wherever there is a significant federal obliga-
tion. This is particularly so in places with high pov-
erty or other economic and social disadvantages.
Weaverville Community Forest, 
California
Time Frame: 1999 to present
Key Actors: 
• Trinity County Resource Conservation District
• Diversity of Weaverville residents
• Redding District, BLM
• Shasta-Trinity National Forest
Background: In 1999, the 
BLM proposed a land 
exchange (basically a 
land sale) near the town 
of Weaverville in far 
northern California, which 
would have put the par-
cels in the hands of Sierra 
Pacific Industries, 
California’s largest industrial timberland owner. At 
issue were several small parcels of Redding District, 
BLM, that were intermixed with private forestlands 
and residential areas. These lands were getting a lot 
recreational use, had high fire danger, and experi-
enced growing invasive weed problems. There was 
also some sizable timber. Neighbors did not want 
the BLM to privatize the lands. They persuaded the 
Trinity County Resource Conservation District (Trinity 
RCD) and the Trinity County Board of Supervisors to 
ask the BLM to consider an alternative to an exchange. 
They began discussions to determine how the com-
munity could have a role in managing the land. 
The Trinity RCD and others considered purchasing 
the lands from the BLM to create a community-
owned forest, which the community (through the 
RCD) would manage as a working forest. However, 
they could not find the necessary financing; to pay 
for the purchase, they would have to cut the timber 
at rates that leaders felt were not sustainable. 
Stewardship Contracts and Agreements: Rather than 
trading or selling the land, in 2004, the Redding 
District, BLM, proposed creating a stewardship 
agreement with the Trinity RCD that would allow 
the RCD and the BLM to jointly manage the land.  
In 2005, the Trinity RCD and the Redding District 
signed a 10-year master stewardship agreement. 
After the agreement with the BLM was signed, the 
Trinity RCD turned to the U.S. Forest Service to 
develop a similar 10-year stewardship agreement  
for 12,000 acres of U.S. Forest Service land, also  
in relatively small parcels, sandwiched between 
Weaverville and a wilderness area.
In parallel to the conversations about community 
ownership, the BLM had conducted an environmen-
tal analysis for a thinning project to reduce fire haz-
ard near homes adjacent to the BLM parcels. The 
first activity of the Trinity RCD under the agreement 
was to implement the thinning projects. The BLM 
put the project out for bid and sold the logs to a 
local sawmill, Trinity River Lumber, and a small 
loads of chips to a biomass-electrical facility in 
California’s Central Valley. The gross income was 
just over $300,000; net of costs, the BLM was able 
to deposit over just $100,000 of retained receipts 
into the Community Forest Stewardship Fund. Over 
the next year, the Trinity RCD raised another 
$100,000 to fund projects on the community forest. 
Because this project is not simply a stewardship 
agreement, but is a stewardship agreement built 
around the idea of a community forest, it is not only 
about ecological improvements and local economic 
benefit, but also includes recreational, educational, 
and cultural components. This diverse approach has 
been possible in part because of the diversity of funds 
that this collaboration has been able to access. 
In the second year of implementation, the Trinity RCD 
started the environmental analysis on the second-
phase thinning projects. But it also monitored the 
health of a Christmas tree patch along an electrical 
line right-of-way and did some replanting, planned 
for new hiking and accessible trails, and led field 
tours and classes. The community forest also includes 
Weaverville
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a number of historical and cultural sites —including 
heritage orchards, a Chinese cemetery, and black 
locust trees, perhaps originally planted by Chinese 
settlers/miners, as well as important historic and cur-
rent Native American sites. Much of the second year 
also involved identifying, mapping, and analyzing 
these sites. In 2009, the Weaverville Community 
Forest won the Secretary of the Interior’s Partner in 
Conservation Award. The next phase of the project 
includes planning future thinning projects as well as 
developing management strategies with the U.S. 
Forest Service.
Lessons Learned: This project turned a local political 
controversy into a collaborative venture—turning 
lemons into lemonade. It has taken the concepts of 
stewardship contracting a step farther to build a 
sustained federal-community partnership for com-
prehensive management, which not only includes 
restoration but also a broad array of cultural, recre-
ation, and education activities. 
The collaboration used signs, newspaper articles, 
and the Trinity RCD web page to publicize accom-
plishments, building credibility in a way that the 
federal land management agencies could not do on 
their own. Although the stewardship funds will 
likely be focused on the land management activities, 
this partnership and the associated fundraising are 
allowing for a much broader focus than would have 
been otherwise possible.
BLM High Desert District, Wyoming
Time Frame: 2007 to present
Key Actors: 
• Wyoming Bureau of Land Management
• Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation (RMEF)
• Wyoming Department of Fish and Game
• Private landowners
Background: The RMEF, 
as with several other hunt-
ing and fishing nonprofit 
organizations, has long 
provided funding to fed-
eral land management 
agencies to manage for 
fish and wildlife habitat. Stewardship contracting 
authorities have allowed them to enter into longer 
term, more complex agreements to conduct restora-
tion work on the ground. For example, the RMEF 
has entered into several 10-year stewardship agree-
ments with the BLM and the U.S. Forest Service 
nationally. Among the earliest of these agreements 
was one for an 85,000-acre project on the Seeley 
Lake District of the Lolo National Forest in Montana 
to restore elk habitat along a key migration route. 
Stewardship Contracts and Agreements: In 2007, 
the RMEF signed a stewardship agreement with the 
Wyoming state office of the BLM involving a project 
area of 174,000 acres of BLM land along with 
57,300 acres of private lands and 12,000 acres of 
state lands. The overarching purpose of the Wyoming 
Front Aspen Restoration Project is to restore aspen 
stands across landownerships by removing conifer 
trees that have encroached upon the aspen due to 
wildfire exclusion and which are inhibiting aspen 
regeneration.
Unlike the Siuslaw National Forest, where the sale 
of timber has generated several million dollars for 
restoration work, the total timber value in the first 
three years of this project was approximately 
$8,000. Although the timber value was low, the 
RMEF has sought uses for the removed trees and 
sold them for saw timber, Christmas trees, and chips 
for bio energy, mulch, landscaping, and oil well miti-
gation. The rest of the money to implement these 
projects has come from BLM-appropriated funds as 
well as grant funds and donations that the RMEF has 
raised. Over the first three years of the project, the 
BLM contributed about $125,000 annually and the 
RMEF contributed $150,000–$200,000 per year.
Lessons Learned: In some cases, such as this aspen 
project, stewardship contracting has served to 
strengthen and expand existing partnerships 
between the agencies and nongovernmental organi-
zations. Here, stewardship contracting is not so 
much about trading goods for services or other con-
tracting authorities, but rather about allowing the 
agency to use a cooperative agreement rather than a 
contract for land management activities, bringing 
nonfederal financial resources to the task of federal 
land restoration, allowing for a long-term arrange-
ment, and permitting the removal and sale of mate-
rial that needs to be taken from the restoration site 
for ecological reasons. 
BLM High 
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This stewardship agreement was been one of only a 
couple of projects to use stewardship contracting 
authorities on BLM lands in Wyoming. Although the 
Wyoming state BLM office has a stewardship coordi-
nator and some field staff interested in pursuing stew-
ardship contrast, it lacked the procurement staff with 
the training to put together stewardship contracts 
and agreements. This meant that program personnel 
have been reliant on other offices in other states to 
create their stewardship contracts and agreements. 
For example, the Oregon state BLM office put 
together the RMEF agreement. These other state 
offices, with their own workloads, naturally put 
requests from the Wyoming BLM office low on the 
priority list. 
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The stewardship contracting case studies describe 
strategies that the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM 
have used to successfully meet their land manage-
ment mission responsibilities, using both informal 
groups and formal financial mechanisms. They also 
describe the challenges of why these strategies are 
not used more widely, either in their own agencies 
or in other policy arenas.
However, an analysis of the successes and chal-
lenges that these case studies have had in develop-
ing collaborative stewardship contracting identifies 
some commonalities that can not only help foster a 
broader use of collaborative approaches in land 
management agencies but also in other government 
organizations. Based on the experiences of the U.S. 
Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, 
this section presents four strategies to promote col-
laboration. This section offers a mix of strategies that 
senior executives across government can use to 
make it easier for their front-line staff to collaborate. 
National and regional senior executives from a wide 
range of organizations may need to engage in sup-
porting collaborative efforts. In particular, steward-
ship contracting efforts suggests that executives 
managing an agency’s core mission are central 
actors in any front-line collaborative effort. In addi-
tion, acquisition management executives can play a 
key role because their direction and clarity regard-
ing contracts and agreements greatly affect the ease 
of using formal agreements and money to support 
collaboration. Finally, the decisions of those 
involved in budget formulation and allocation, as 
well as performance management, impact whether 
frontline staff have the incentives and ability to fol-
low through on their local agreements.
Strategy One: Create time and space 
for collaboration to develop and 
mature 
Robust collaboration requires significant investment 
in time, money, and social capital. As collaboratives 
build trust and facility in working together over 
time, their accomplishments grow, but rushing col-
laboration early on risks failure. In all of the cases 
described here, frontline personnel and their exter-
nal partners have taken years—more than a decade, 
in some cases—to reach the stage at which they are 
today. 
The Siuslaw, Shasta-Trinity (Hayfork and 
Weaverville), and Deschutes National Forests 
(Sisters) were allocated early pilot project authority, 
and used these pilots as springboards to build and 
expand their collaborative relationships over a num-
ber of years. These collaboratives began as conver-
sations, meetings, and field tours, which built 
common ground as well as identified barriers that 
the forests and their partners could work through 
Strategies for Supporting 
Frontline Collaboration
Supporting Frontline Collaboration:  
A Checklist
• Create time and space for collaboration to 
develop and mature
• Change the rules to encourage collaboration
• Provide incentives to collaborate—or conse-
quences if they don’t
• Invest in building the capacity of both govern-
mental and nongovernmental partners involved 
in a collaborative effort
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together. Over time, these relationships evolved to 
also include formal financial arrangements—cooper-
ative stewardship agreements with key collaborators 
and innovative stewardship contracts to create 
mutual benefit. The Siuslaw and the Shasta-Trinity 
National Forests built their stewardship contracting 
programs on pre-existing collaboratives and deep-
ened those relationships. In the Sisters case, stew-
ardship contracting and the multiparty monitoring 
efforts served as the foundation for building a sus-
tained collaborative relationship with a diverse 
group of individuals and organizations, including 
those that had a long history of appealing and liti-
gating timber sales and other projects on the ranger 
district.
Initially, collaboration can be slow to result in con-
crete outcomes. Often, collaborative groups have to 
start small and grow slowly over time. The first collab-
orative project in the Hayfork Ranger District took 
four years to come to fruition and covered 29 acres. 
By 2000, it was able to implement a project of 200 
acres, and in 2003, 500 acres. By 2007, it was 
implementing a 5,000-acre project. By 2008, it was 
conducting planning in a 100,000 acre project area.
Moreover, collaboration is mostly likely to be effec-
tive as an ongoing relationship involving a long 
series of projects with evolving innovations. 
Although agency personnel sometimes initially think 
of collaboration as something that will occur during 
the course of a single project, it often evolves from 
there to a way of doing business. Collaboration is 
too time-consuming to create anew with each proj-
ect. Moreover, in small communities, the social cap-
ital (or social baggage) created in one project will 
be carried to the next. 
It is important for senior managers involved in mis-
sion-area management, budget, and performance 
accountability to work with their staff to create the 
space in work plans and accomplishment expecta-
tions to develop collaboratives. Executives in a num-
ber of different roles can create the time and space 
for collaboration. This may require providing fund-
ing for staff time and collaborative facilitation with-
out an expectation that the frontline management 
unit will have many concrete accomplishments to 
show for it in the short term.
Strategy Two: Change the rules to 
encourage collaboration
This can be done in several ways:
Fund agreements that have been collaboratively 
developed. Collaborative governance implies that 
collaborators are going to jointly develop and 
implement plans for action. These plans likely will 
reflect local biophysical, social, political, and eco-
nomic circumstances and may not be exactly what 
the field staff’s superiors envisioned. But, when 
frontline staff and their partners succeed in reaching 
agreement only to find that there is no money to 
support implementation, relationships can quickly 
sour. This has been a central dynamic for the Shasta-
Trinity National Forest, where budgets are extremely 
tight and the biophysical conditions of the land-
scape make thinning expensive. Hard-earned agree-
ment often has been foiled by a lack of money to 
implement.
Clearly, frontline staff have an obligation, as part of 
the collaborative process, to keep expectations in 
check about what is likely to be financially viable. 
Yet frequently, funds are not available because senior 
executives are not backing up their direction to col-
laborate with budgetary commitments. Sometimes 
frontline staff do not adequately anticipate out-year 
funding needs associated with collaborative agree-
ments that are still in discussion. 
To address funding issues, national-level senior 
executives can first develop direction and guidance 
that says that the agency will prioritize for funding 
projects that have been collaboratively developed. 
Second, senior executives can support field staff to 
anticipate needs for budget in out-years by encour-
aging them to request funds in anticipation of an 
agreement developing. Senior leadership may  
need to be willing to support out-year funding  
for somewhat vaguely defined projects, when the  
collaborative process has not yet fully determined 
what will occur. They may need to advocate with 
departmental political appointees and the Office  
of Management and Budget (OMB) for budget and 
performance authority that supports the transition.
Expand local discretion to collaborate. For frontline 
staff members to be able to collaborate, they need 
to have enough decision space so that they can 
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make meaningful decisions. One challenge to collab-
oration comes when it is essentially an implementa-
tion exercise, with little of substance at issue. Partners 
are unlikely to invest the significant time and money 
in a collaboration, in which there are no major deci-
sions to be made. Mid-level and senior executives 
should consider what sorts of decision-making 
authority they can push downward to frontline staff 
so as to create a broader array of choices for agency 
collaboration. In addition, these same executives 
need to consider carefully when they centralize for-
merly decentralized decisions. Taking away local 
decision-making authority in the midst of collabora-
tion can harm the collaborator’s trust in the agency.
A second challenge is creating enough oversight 
over field staff while the agency learns how to use 
new tools and procedures without creating so little 
flexibility that the process becomes unattractive to 
use. Implementing new tools creates political and 
legal risks for agencies, which requires them to pro-
ceed with caution. Yet, collaboration requires open-
ing up and becoming more flexible if partners are to 
have a real role. Both the BLM and the U.S. Forest 
Service require that the regional line office approve 
stewardship projects, whereas most other project 
development and contracting selection is done at 
the national forest or BLM district level. Although 
this was sensible when national forest and BLM dis-
tricts were learning to use the tool, an approval pro-
cess that requires a half-dozen signatures is simply 
time-consuming once frontline staff have proven 
their capacity to use the authority. The U.S. Forest 
Service’s stewardship contracting board of directors 
is considering changing this requirement.
Continually update old procedures to support a 
collaborative approach. As agencies engage in new 
types of collaboration, they may well find that many 
long-effective procedures become cumbersome 
barriers. Solutions and new approaches will likely 
emerge over time as field staff develop new innova-
tions and identify new problems. When developing a 
new collaborative system, national-level executives 
should task staff with the responsibility for develop-
ing and implementing a system for continual learn-
ing and procedural improvements. A key component 
of this system needs feedback mechanisms from staff 
throughout the chain of command as well as direct 
feedback from field collaborators to the national staff 
who are implementing procedural changes.
In the case of stewardship contracting, both the U.S. 
Forest Service and the BLM needed to issue guid-
ance to help staff develop stewardship projects, con-
tracts, and agreements. This involved changing 
timber sale procedures and forms that had been the 
same for decades. Even after the initial guidance, the 
board of directors has continued to make both incre-
mental and major changes, based on feedback from 
field personnel and stakeholders. In addition, the 
U.S. Forest Service created two contracting tem-
plates, based in large part on the contracts that had 
been developed in the field during the pilot period. 
This was followed in 2009 by the release of a stew-
ardship agreement template, also building on agree-
ments that innovative national forests had developed. 
In late 2009, the U.S. Forest Service announced that 
it would be developing a new, unified stewardship 
contracting template, having realized that the original 
templates were too cumbersome and could be 
improved using lessons from the field.
Midway through the 10-year authority period, the 
board of directors convened an internal review 
committee. The committee held two listening ses-
sions (in Montana and Washington, D.C.) to seek 
feedback from agency personnel and stakeholders 
engaged in stewardship contracting. Using these lis-
tening sessions, the committee created a list of 
activities that it would work on to improve steward-
ship contracting. 
In addition to stewardship contracting-specific  
procedural changes, with a growing amount of col-
laboration and increasing use of their agreements 
authority, acquisition management embarked on  
a two-year revision of agreement procedures and 
forms which involved approval from OMB as 
required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. 
Strategy Three: Create incentives 
to staff to collaborate—or conse-
quences if they don’t
The stewardship contracting case studies highlight 
the use of incentives.
Require field units to collaborate. Although some 
personnel will seek out nongovernmental partners 
without being directed to do so, turning collaboration 
into an agency-wide priority likely will require some 
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direction from above. It may well help—as has been 
the case here—to require collaboration around par-
ticular activities such as stewardship contracting as 
well as more general activities. Doing so provides 
something concrete on which field personnel can 
focus their attention. 
In the case of stewardship contracting, the U.S. 
Forest Service and BLM guidance have not pre-
scribed what exact form collaboration should take 
or who should be involved, but rather said that it 
should reflect local circumstances. Each national 
forest and BLM district is different in the kinds of 
partners that it will need to engage, the amount of 
conflict or complexity it faces, and the amount of 
interest that partners have in engaging with the 
agency. Providing the room for managers to create 
collaboration that reflects the place at which they 
are working is particularly important in land man-
agement, where local ecological conditions and 
interested parties vary considerably from place to 
place, but is likely to be true in other sectors as 
well, because local social and political circum-
stances vary so widely across the United States. 
One drawback of not taking a more prescriptive 
approach is that it risks that, in some places, agency 
personnel will chose to pursue weak collaboration 
because they are not interested in a more robust 
approach, not because there is an inherent lack of 
interest in collaboration locally. One way that some 
regional foresters have tried to address this is to ask 
national forests to describe in some detail the col-
laborative process they are using as part of their 
application for approval of a stewardship project. 
Guidance also can include assistance in helping 
field staff to understand how and when they are  
permitted to engage with the public as well as any 
legal requirements. For example, as part of the guid-
ance, frontline staff needs to understand how they 
can collaborate without becoming entangled in the 
FACA. Confusion over the FACA can create an 
excuse for not collaborating as well as inadvertent 
violations of the FACA. It also may be helpful to pro-
vide clarity on limits to collaboration; sometimes 
inexperienced field personnel may assume that they 
cannot collaborate with the public on a particular 
phase of project development simply because it has 
not been the practice to do so. Knowing that collab-
oration is acceptable and understanding any real 
legal limitations can help frontline staff become 
more comfortable with collaboration. 
Finally, leading by example can help to foster local-
level collaboration. That is, midlevel and senior staff 
also should be engaging in collaboration in decision-
making. This well may look different than local-level 
collaboration, reflecting the different roles of more 
senior staff. One example of this was the U.S. Forest 
Service’s use of listening sessions to elicit issues and 
suggestions from stakeholders and the field about 
how to improve stewardship contracting. 
Ensure performance measures support collaboration. 
Creating performance measures that align with col-
laboration can be difficult—something that continues 
to be a major challenge for the U.S. Forest Service 
and the BLM, which have a long tradition of output-
oriented accomplishment targets. Conversations 
about how to increase the use of stewardship con-
tracting seems to frequently evolve into conversations 
about how the agency’s performance measures are 
leading them to seek short-term accomplishments 
rather than investing in longer-term payoffs.
Particularly challenging for these agencies is devel-
oping outcome-oriented performance measures that 
are relatively straightforward to measure and satisfy 
the OMB. For the U.S. Forest Service, the most 
important agency targets have been “acres treated” 
and “volume of timber harvested.” Obligations to 
meet high targets with declining budgets have been 
particularly challenging. Moreover, the funds that 
have been available have been concentrated largely 
in hazardous fuels reduction, with only limited 
money for other types of restoration, such as endan-
gered species habitat and road restoration and 
noxious weed abatement.
Reducing or modifying performance measures can 
be a slow, politicized process involving numerous 
agencies, departments, OMB, and Congress. In the 
interim, senior executives can work to temporarily 
reduce targets without financial penalty for particu-
lar management units that are in the early stages of 
collaboration, when accomplishments are likely to 
be small. Target trading among management units 
can create breathing room for those areas just start-
ing out in collaboration and for those areas with sig-
nificant conflict and low trust, where collaborative 
outcomes will take a particularly long time to 
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achieve. This has been done at the forest as well as 
at the regional level in the U.S. Forest Service. 
Another approach that both the U.S. Forest Service 
and the BLM have used is to create stewardship con-
tracting targets, requiring each unit to undertake a 
certain number of stewardship contracts each year. 
Feelings have been mixed about the effectiveness of 
this approach for getting people to try the new 
authority. On the one hand, since there is a relatively 
steep learning curve for stewardship contracting and 
many agency staff seem to like it once they have 
tried it, the targets can help field units take the initial 
plunge. On the other hand, for those truly resistant 
to stewardship contracting, the targets seem to lead 
to resentment. Finally, this approach may be helpful 
initially but may not be needed in the long term. 
Once a region or set of national forests has devel-
oped the habit of using stewardship contracting, tar-
gets may no longer be that helpful. For example, the 
Oregon BLM stewardship contractor no longer dis-
tributes targets to the BLM districts, as the state office 
as a whole achieves the target with no difficulty as a 
natural consequence of the program of work. The 
Wyoming BLM ignores the target because it cannot 
implement a stewardship contract due to its lack of 
trained procurement staff, and relies on other state 
offices to pick up the target.
Strategy Four: Invest in building the 
capacity of both governmental and 
nongovernmental partners involved 
in a collaborative effort
Federal participants in collaboration need to recog-
nize where investments need to be made.
Create a cadre of well-trained procurement and 
agreements personnel. Although acquisition is rarely 
a core mission activity, senior leadership still needs 
to ensure that there is an adequate number of well-
trained agency personnel willing to use the kinds of 
instruments necessary for collaborative financial 
arrangements. As we saw with the Wyoming BLM 
case, the lack of procurement staff capacity to cre-
ate stewardship contracts and agreements was a bar-
rier to the BLM expanding the use of these tools. 
This is an example of a frequent challenge that both 
agencies face, which has been the difficult transition 
from the old way of doing business (adversarial con-
tracting) to the new way of doing business (coopera-
tive relationships with nonprofit and private sectors). 
The U.S. Forest Service too has struggled to train 
enough contracting staff familiar with the particulars 
of creating stewardship contracts. 
Although the U.S. Forest Service has considerable 
authority to enter into a wide variety of agreements 
with nonprofit organizations, it also has struggled 
with a lack of trained staff and systems in place to 
develop and execute a range of agreements. As sug-
gested above, over the course of the past few years, 
the U.S. Forest Service acquisition management has 
revamped its agreements guidance and made an 
effort to increase the training of its staff. Training has 
reduced the time and effort that both the frontline 
staff and their partners spend developing formal 
agreements, which increases trust and time spent on 
mission-relevant activities. This groundwork in stew-
ardship contracting, and in agreements more gener-
ally, served them well when the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act funds arrived; they were able 
to add funds via task order to new existing steward-
ship contracts and agreements as well as to execute 
new agreements quickly. 
Support the organizational health of partner orga-
nizations. To build robust collaboratives, particularly 
in places that have been traditionally underserved, 
have high poverty, or otherwise lack capacity to 
engage, agencies may have to contribute funds and 
technical assistance to build the social organization 
necessary for rich collaboration. This may involve 
frontline units funding partner organizations to orga-
nize and host meetings, and conduct outreach to 
engage diverse stakeholders. In the Shasta-Trinty 
case, the ranger district partially funded the 
Watershed Center to facilitate the Post Mountain 
community meetings. Similarly, the Siuslaw National 
Forest hired a facilitator from Eugene to organize 
monthly meetings and lead the monitoring activities, 
even though there was relatively little conflict 
among participants.
If a federal agency is going to contract with busi-
nesses, it needs to ensure that businesses exist and 
remain healthy enough to fulfill agency needs. This 
is not a given, especially when the federal govern-
ment demands services and skills that are different 
from those of the private marketplace. The central 
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challenge in the Shasta-Trinty case has been that 
there is virtually no local logging and contract 
capacity left. This is because federal lands surround 
the community, and those landowners have not been 
offering consistent-enough contract work; and most 
businesses have folded. This is why the Watershed 
Center entered into its first stewardship agreement, 
and later bid on the stewardship contract. Although 
the Watershed Center used these agreements and 
contracts to foster local logging capacity, it has 
struggled to find interested, qualified entrepreneurs. 
In the Deschutes National Forest case, the forest 
used stewardship contractors to try to engage busi-
nesses to purchase new equipment and to build new 
business relationships to take on new kinds of work. 
It used best-value criteria and end-results contract-
ing to entice a couple of different contractors to 
experiment with new equipment and techniques 
and identify new markets for small trees and brush. 
Finally, in the Siuslaw case, the ranger district talked 
with its traditional timber purchasers to explain 
stewardship contracts and minimize any unneces-
sary concerns, in order to reduce the chance of 
receiving no bids. Senior executives can foster this 
sort of field attention by creating contracting guid-
ance that considers local economic benefit as a part 
of their contracting goals and by increasing the con-
sistency of contracting offerings. In addition, they 
can ensure that frontline staff have the authority, 
tools, and financial resources to quickly and easily 
enter into agreements with partners to support col-
laborative processes.
Train staff and partners, and develop peer-to-peer 
learning. All agencies conduct staff training on a 
broad array of issues; collaboration is no different 
than other skill—it needs to be learned. To foster the 
use of stewardship contracting, the U.S. Forest 
Service developed a series of training modules spe-
cific to stewardship contracting. These ranged from 
introductory information for general audiences to 
quite detailed information, such as contract prepara-
tion for contracting officers. 
In some regions of the country—particularly in 
Oregon and California—regional stewardship coor-
dinators and their partners went a step further and 
held joint training sessions. Participants in some of 
the early stewardship collaboratives have helped 
foster stewardship efforts in other places. For exam-
ple, the facilitators of the Siuslaw Stewardship 
Group and Post Mountain group worked together 
with the U.S. Forest Service to hold a series of train-
ings in the Sierra Nevada to help forests and part-
ners there learn about stewardship contracting, 
biomass utilization, and collaboration. Including 
both agency and nongovernmental partners in joint 
training sessions helped to create a shared under-
standing of the potential and procedures of steward-
ship contracting.
In the frequent reviews of stewardship contracting, a 
number of stakeholders and agency personnel have 
recommended that the agencies develop peer-to-
peer learning processes to accelerate learning. In 
the pilot stages of stewardship contracting, regional 
multiparty monitoring teams held learning meetings 
that brought together one U.S. Forest Service staff 
member and one community person from each proj-
ect to share lessons from their efforts. These facili-
tated discussions helped people share how they 
were experimenting and solving particular prob-
lems. The efficacy of even these limited peer-to-peer 
learning methods suggested that partnership coordi-
nators and others might create a deliberate system 
of formal and informal information sharing across 
frontline units.
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U.S. Forest Service and BLM efforts to use steward-
ship contracting to support frontline collaboration 
offer a number of lessons for other federal agencies. 
Although stewardship contracting authorities may 
apply uniquely to federal land management agen-
cies that have something (timber) to sell, the con-
cepts behind stewardship contracting could be 
useful for other agencies. Beyond the particulars, the 
U.S. Forest Service and BLM experiences with stew-
ardship contracting make clear the importance of 
moving beyond simply directing frontline staff to 
collaborate and of creating the institutional changes 
necessary to support collaboration. Some activities, 
such as training for collaboration and adequate 
agreements authorities, are fairly directly related to 
the process of collaboration. 
Many of the changes needed to encourage greater 
use of collaboration came from places in the agency 
that do not initially appear to have much to do with 
the collaborative process, such as budget formula-
tion and allocation and performance management, 
which also need to support frontline collaboration. 
Moreover, successfully supporting collaboration 
requires that senior executives themselves engage in 
collaborative and iterative learning by creating sys-
tems to takes lessons from the frontline staff and 
stakeholders and turn them into new guidance, 
which improves practices and procedures and 
reflects innovations and changing conditions on  
the front line.
Frontline collaboration well beyond stewardship 
contracting has played a key role in the transformation 
of the U.S. Forest Service and BLM over the past two 
decades. By the early 1990s, both agencies had suf-
fered a considerable loss of public and congressional 
trust. With the role of courts and interest group poli-
tics, multiple constituencies have the ability to halt 
agency actions through legal action and political 
maneuvering. Collaboration has certainly been diffi-
cult and time-consuming for both agencies, and 
continues to be institutionally difficult for the front 
line. However, to the extent that the agencies have 
been able to move beyond rancor and gridlock, 
frontline collaboration has played a key role in 
developing new solutions, building support for 
action, and modernizing the land management 
direction of the agencies. 
Conclusion
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